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1Abstract
This paper examines the common stock market response to the negative
environmental events using event study methodology. I consider a sample of 70
harmful events in oil & gas and energy industries from 2000 to 2011, including 12
chemical release accidents, 24 gas leaks and 34 oil spill events. The results
indicate that the sudden harmful environmental events do generate negative
abnormal returns over the event period. Shareholders of responsible firms suffer
significantly negative abnormal returns (about 1.56% on average) in the
following two days after the event date. In addition, the impact of firm distinct
characteristics and event specific factors are analyzed in the cross- sectional
analysis. The outcomes imply that only event type contributes to the abnormal
returns. The influences of firm size, gearing ratio, toxic release and explosion are
too minor to explain the observed abnormal returns.
1. Introduction
In the early view of risk management, managers are usually familiar with three
broad categories of firm risk: technological, economic and political. However, with
the development of globalization, the more interactions among businesses, the
more factors are involved to affect the overall performance of a firm (Kytle et, al,
2005). During the past decade, social risk has been considered a more and more
important element in the field of business risk management. From a civil society
perspective, a company may be responsible for its social performance, deserving
awards and also penalties for their related practices.
As a crucial component and a proxy for corporate social performance, firm
environmental performances have drawn more and more social attentions since
late1980s. An empirical survey (Rosewicz, 1990) indicates that more and more
people have realized and emphasized the importance of the natural
environmental. On average, individuals, by a ratio of six to one, are willing to pay
2more for the products which are good for environment. Some studies suggest that
investors in common stock market appear to reward and punish for corporate
good and harmful environmental performances as well (e.g. Klassen and
McLaughlin, 1996). Besides, the government started to take a series of actions in
order to make corporate environmental performance more transparent to the
society. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began to
publish Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data in the year of 1989. From this dataset,
the public are able to learn more about the company waste management activities
and the details of industries toxic chemical release in their annual reports. What is
more, many executives are also aware of the significance of publishing corporate
management details with respect of the environmental section. Hence, many
international firms have participated in the U.S. Global Reporting Initiative
Programme (GRI) since the end of 1990, voluntarily reporting corporate
environmental and social activities with the guidelines provided by GRI.
With the increasingly concerns about the natural environment, negative
environmental events have become one of the major social risks that companies
have to face. Such accidents, especially serious incidents or even catastrophes, may
directly influence firms profits by interrupting their production process. What is
more important is that they may result in externalities damages and pollutions on
creature health and ecosystems. For instance, the explosion of BP deep water
horizon disaster in 2010 led to 11 people death and other injuries. Up to 4.9
million barrels crude oil were leaked into the Gulf of Mexico. Hundreds of species
lives were threatened because the floated oil over the surface of sea would cut off
the oxygen supply to the marine life. And the ecosystems deep beneath the ocean
also might die out as the result of large amount of spilled oil. Even though the
probability of such disaster is extremely low, this accident still well illustrates the
enormous potential risks faced by oil & gas companies.
In this paper, I attempt to examine the effect of negative environmental events on
3firm market value in the period of 2000 to 2011. According to some academics
suggestions, this topic is particularly meaningful because the potentially
significant market value losses can force the companies to improve related
technology and management skills. In addition, the market financial punishments
enable the responsible firms to comply with the safety and environmental
regulations in the future. If a severe and huge market penalty is confirmed,
government may issue new policies or standards to prevent similar incidents
(Tietenberg, 1998; Cohen and Santhakumar, 2007).
To carry out the research, the original sample events were screened from the
Factiva software, which provides all major newspapers and magazines in the
world, such as The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal. Meanwhile, this
search enables me to collect more details about each event, like the pollution
situation and the severity of each accident. The responsible companies were
limited within two industries, oil & gas and energy industries. Compare to other
industries, these two are more likely to experience negative environmental events.
Furthermore, only publicly traded firms that are listed on New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) were taken into consideration in order to examine the common
stock market response. As a result, an original sample of 70 negative events were
set up, using the key words chemical release, gas leak and oil spill along with
toxic and explosion.
Following other studies (e.g. Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Jones and Rubin,
2001), event study methodology was used to test the importance of harmful
environmental events for the shareholder values. Since the first study by Fama et
al (Fama, Fisher et al, 1969), this methodology has become the standard method
of measuring capital market reaction to particular announcement or event. As
event study is based on the assumption of market efficiency, it is particularly
useful to test market response to the information in short term. What is more, on
the basis of other studies reports, firm distinct characteristics and event specific
4factors may also contribute to the stock abnormal returns. Thus, firm size
(represented by the natural logarithm of firm total assets), gearing ratio (the ratio
of total debt to total equity), toxic release, explosion and event type (chemical
release, gas leak and oil spill) were considered to be the potentially explanatory
variables, which were analyzed in the cross-sectional analysis.
Reviewing previous literatures, many studies focus on the environmental
information that are related to judicial actions and examine whether the market
reaction parallels with the amount of fines (e.g. Muoghalu, et al. 1990; Karpoff,
Lott and Rankine, 1998; Lorraine, Collison and Power, 2004, Karpoff, Lott and
Wehrly, 2005; Dasgupta, et al. 2006). Some are interest in the impact of the
ranking announcement of corporate environmental performance (e.g. Hamilton,
1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Gupta and Goldar, 2005; Takeda and Tomozawa,
2006). But only several pay attention to the effect of the original harmful events
information (e.g. Jones and Rubin, 2001; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010).
And the results of these investigations are always conflicting. Therefore, the
purpose of this paper is to test whether the common stock market reacts to such
incidents, and to provide an empirical evidence of the effect of negative events on
firm market value when it is firstly published to the public.
The next section provides detailed reviews of previous theoretical and empirical
literatures on the impact of corporate social performance. The first part discusses
the relationship between CSP and business risk management. Secondly, the
arguments of CSPs impact on firm financial performance are summarized. And
the effect of corporate environmental performance on financial performance is
reviewed in the last part. Section 3 is about the research methodology. The whole
procedure of event study and its limitations are reported in the first part. Second
part describes the selection criteria of the event sample in more details. Finally,
theoretical background and hypothesis are represented. Section 4 analyzes the
5data and discusses the results obtained from the sample. And the conclusions are
summarized in the last section.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Corporate Social Performance and Risk Management
Since 1980s, management literature has begun to highlight social responsibility
as a significant corporate duty in the context of business and society, (e.g. Arlow
and Gannon, 1982; Quinn, Mintzberg and James, 1996). Some scholars emphasize
that managerial actions, especially in modern society, should not only concern
about the best interests of shareholders, but also take the benefits of all
stakeholders into considerations (Berman, Wick et, al 1999). In recent years,
corporate social performance has become an increasingly primary element in
both business management education and practices (Pfeffer and Fong, 2004;
Starkey, Hatchuel and Tempest, 2004; Lockett, Moon and Visser, 2006).
According to Carrolls (1979) literature, there are four dimensions in the model of
corporate social performance: economic, legal, ethical and discretionary
responsibilities. Firms are economic responsible to provide a stable and qualified
products and services to its investors and consumers, complying with the law or
regulations. Meanwhile, firms are also responsible for the society and community
from ethical and discretionary aspects. In addition, even though there is no
precise definition of corporate social performance, it is generally managed from
two broad construct: stakeholder management and social issue management
(Wood, 1991; Clarkson, 1995). Clarkson (1995) argues that major stakeholder
groups contain investors (e.g. creditors and shareholders), employees, suppliers,
customers, community residents and the natural environment. These factors are
usually considered to be directly related to the operations and survival of a firm.
On the other hand, social issue participations are regarded as other indirectly
related elements of corporate social performance, such as avoiding sin
6industries (gambling, alcohol and tobacco). As a consequence, corporate social
responsibility (CSR) or corporate social performance (CSP) concerns more about
how companies make their profits, not only what they do with them (Kytle et, al,
2005). It emphasizes the manner of management in firms economic and social
impacts, and the stakeholder relationships.
At the same time, CSP has also been considered as a more and more important
element in business risk management during the past decades (Kytle et, al, 2005).
Bowman (1980) discusses the importance of social responsibility in strategic
management, and points out that proactive CSP may contribute to reducing
potential sources of business risk, such as environmental damage. Even though a
companys systematic risk may be insignificantly influenced by its social
responsibility (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987), high degree of corporate social
performance is expected to reduce corporate financial risk from the perspective
of instrumental stakeholder theory (T. Donaldson & Preston, 1995) and
management theory (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Furthermore, Luo and
Bhattacharya (2009) suggest that doing social responsibility can produce ethical
capital and provide insurance-like protections for shareholder wealth. Thus,
corporate social performance is likely conductive to managing risks since the
core concept of risk management is to maximize shareholder value.
Some researchers have conducted a series of empirical investigations to examine
the theories and found that CSP does have a relationship with risk (e.g. Spicer,
1978; Ullmann, 1985; Kneader et al. 2005). Spicers (1978) study shows that
these two are negatively correlated, as CSP deteriorates, risk increased; while as
CSP improves, risk decreased. Marc and John (2001) found support evidence for
this negative relationship using a meta-analysis. Becchettia and Ciciretti (2009)
also report a similar conclusion after exploring the financial risks of social
responsible firms and the control sample firms. In other words, relatively good
7social performance or a high level of CSR may contribute to a relatively lower
financial risk.
Reviewing previous studies, three advantages of corporate social performance
are discussed in their literatures (e.g. Schneeweis et, al 1988; Marc and John,
2001; Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009). Firstly, it enables a firm to keep a more
stable relation with financial institutions and the related government departments.
The second advantage is that companies may also have a low ratio of total debt to
total asset which benefits from its high social performance image to some degree.
This enables such firms less sensitive to some external events, such as
governmental actions. Consequently, it reduces both accounting-based and
market-based total risks. Furthermore, the benefits of excellent social
performance may emerge in later periods. Compare to other firms, a low level of
total debt decreases risks of breaching agreements and claims, not matter explicit
or implicit. As the probabilities of implementing contracts increase, the
variability of its financial risk may decline gradually.
On the other hand, a companys financial risk may increase because it performs
poor social practices or undertakes a low level of social responsibility. To some
extent, investors relate social performance to the management abilities and skills
of a firm (Alexander & Bucholtz, 1978). Thus firms with this kind of behaviours
may be regarded as riskier investments from investors point of views. Costs
problem is another consideration for some investors. They believe if a company
undertake less social responsibility, the occurrence probability of negative social
performance may increase and then, it has to spend more expenditure in the
future. For instance, government may levy fines for regulatory violations and firms
may be forced to renew their operation sets in order to meet regulation
requirements. What is more, the corporate ability of obtaining capital may be
more fluctuant due to low degree of social performance.
Furthermore, several empirical surveys are carried out in earlier studies from
8executive perceptions to investigate the importance of corporate social
performance to the business management. Holmess (1976) study find that the
majority of the investigated executives believe high level of social performance
will bring about better outcomes rather than negative outcomes. From their
views, social involvement has been no longer considered as desirable but as
necessary in business process despite it will lead to a profit reduction in short
term or even probably in the long run. Supported evidence is found by Ostlund
(1977). Managers, in general, are consistent with the participating activities
socially instead of doing against it. Besides, Bowman (1977) point out that many
managers attempt to build a positive social image especially in the area of
environmental concerns. Even though this kind of investments may affect
corporate profits and other resource development, such as technology
improvement, most of the executives in the survey emphasize the importance of
taking environmental problems into consideration. It is worth noting that
government pressure is not the solely reason in the considerations of managers. It
may also relate to industry self-interest in the long run. In other words, a failure to
cope with an environmental problem effectively may result in new or more
government regulations in the future, which must cost more than current
expenditures on environmental issues. Therefore, in order to reduce the risk of
policy change, many managers are more likely to involve in environmental
performance.
2.2 Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance
Since corporate social performance is negatively correlated to financial risks on
the whole, a large number of researchers concern about the relationship between
CSP and its financial performance. In theory, Alexander and Buchholz (1978) state
that:
Socially aware and concerned management will possess the requisite kills to run a
superior company in the traditional sense of financial performance, thus making its
9firm an attractive investment (p479).
Thus, a positive correlation indicates that company is capable of dealing with its
stakeholder relationships and able to run its business effectively (Ullman, 1985).
However, findings in this kind of investigations are conflicting and different
authors provide various explanations according to their results.
Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) examine the effect of social performance on
corporate growth in earnings per share from 1967-19974 that are relative to
industry average. The corporate social performances are divided into three levels
according to an earlier studys rating of honorable mention. And 28 companies
are also adopted from Moskowitz sample list which are belong to Fortune 500 in
1975 at the same time. The results show that relatively honorable mention firms
tend to have higher growth in earnings per share, which implies that there is a
positive relationship between CSP and its financial performance. Diltz (1995)
explores 28 common stock portfolios between 1989 and 1991 and found that
capital market react similarly to social responsible investments and traditional
investments. The stock market appears to reward corporate ethical investments,
such as good environmental performance and charitable giving. Furthermore,
Orlitzky et, al (2003) conduct an empirical research to analyze the relationship
between CSP and firm financial performance using a meta-analysis of 52 studies.
The results confirm a positive association between these two. And firms are
likely to pay off when they invest in social responsibilities. On the other hand,
evidences (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Gupta and Goldar, 2005) demonstrate
that poor social performance can result in a negative market reaction, which
reflects market assessment of the influence on corporate future earnings. Support
evidence of this positive correlation between CSP and financial performance is
also reported in other studies (e.g. Bowman and Haire 1975; Jarrel and Peltzman,
1985; Posnikoff, 1997; Cellier and Chollet, 2011). In addition, Godfrey, et al (2009)
argue that if corporate social performance are beneficial to their stakeholders or
10
society at large, it may provide a kind of insurance-like protection when
companies suffer negative legal or regulatory events.
In contrast, when Vance (1975) using 14 identified social responsive firms and
the rating honorable mention scale from the same sample of Moskowitzs research,
a negative correlation is founded between corporate social performance and firm
stock price change. In order to confirm this result, Vance investigate another
survey in his study, using a social reputational ranking from Business and Society
Review, which are rated by business students and executives in 1972. In this
survey, 45 companies are selected and price per share changes are examined.
Finally, both of these two surveys demonstrate that CSP and firm stock market
performance have a negative relationship. Besides, many researchers report a
neutral impact of CSP on firm financial performance. For instance, Folger and Nutt
(1975) conclude that social performance has no positive association with
corporate financial performance. They research 9 paper companies
environmental performance according to government pollution index and
examine firm changes of price earnings ratio and common stock price. Teoh et, al
(1999) do a research in South Africa to test the effect of socially investment on
the common stock market. Weak evidence implies that no significant abnormal
returns are generated when such investment information is publicly announced.
Surroca et, al (2010) investigate 599 companies social performances across 28
countries and find that there is no direct relationship between CSP and firm
financial performance. To some extent, the authors suggest that it only indirectly
depends on the mediating effect of a firms intangible resources, rather than CSP.
What is more, it is rather remarkable that Bowman and Haire (1975) put forward
a U-shaped correlation between corporate social performance and firm financial
performance. Part of their research chooses as a sample of 82 firms in food
processing business listing in 1973 moodys Industrial Manual. The level of
corporate responsiveness is measured by the proportion of lines of prose in the
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annual report. And the mean and median returns of equity (ROE) from the years
of 1969-1973 are examined as corporate economic performance. The results
show that both mean and median ROE are higher for firms with some corporate
responsiveness discussion than firms with none. Meanwhile, it casts light on a U-
shape correlation between these two. In other words, firms with medium
mention scale have significantly higher median and mean ROE than either high
or low mention firms. On the basis of Bowman and Haires (1975) finding, it is
thought that corporate financial performance may suffer losses when firms
allocate improper resources on social performance either too much or too little
(Ullmann, 1985).
Finally, it has to acknowledge that the relationship between social performance
and economic performance is complicated. Some researchers are still trying to
quantify the link between the two of them. In the review of Margolis and Walsh
(2001,), they list around 100 previous studies and summarize that although
previous results are inconsistent. However, the overall conclusion expresses a
positive relationship between CSP and the financial performance.
2.3 Corporate Environmental Performance and Financial Performance
Environmental performance is always considered as a crucial component and a
proxy for corporate social performance, especially from the views of executives
(Bowman, 1977). Hence, a host of scholars have concern about its impact on firm
economic performance for several decades. Like the impact of CSP on financial
performance, the relationship between corporate environmental activities to its
financial performance is not conclusive as well. Lorraine, Collison and Power
(2004) attribute the inconsistent results to research methods employed by
researchers varying from study to study. Furthermore, some other factors have
also been regarded as the reasons of inconsistency, such as data sources, sample
size, industry types, company size, and measurement approaches used for
calculating expected stock return. For instance, after conducting static and
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dynamic panel data analysis, Elsayed and Paton (2005) argue that the
environmental performance of a firm has a neutral impact on its financial
performance as firms invest in environmental initiatives until the point where the
marginal cost of investments equals to the marginal benefit. On the other hand,
Konar and Cohen (2001) employ Tobins q to analyze the relationship and
conclude that bad environmental performance is negatively correlated with the
intangible-asset value of the publicly traded companies which belong to the S&P
500. Moreover, evidence of event study show that significant positive abnormal
returns are produced when environmental award news for this company is
published; while significant negative abnormal returns are produced if there is
negative environmental events happened, like an oil spill or an explosion(Klassen
and Mclaughlin, 1996).
Reviewing previous literature, academics have attempted to examine the
correlation from various aspects that is related to environmental information of
the company. Much of the early studies are US-based and pay close attention to
the reports published by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) in 1970-1971.
These reports examine pollution control records and costs of cleaning up the
pollution in petroleum refining, pulp and paper, steel and electric utility industries.
For example, Spicer (1978a) concentrates on associations between a number of
indicators, including profitability, asset size, risk and price/earning ratio and it
environmental performance on CEPs pollution control records. Then he concludes
that larger firms with relatively higher profitability tend to have better pollution
control records. As a consequence, they are considered with lower level of risk by
investors and demonstrate higher price/earnings ratios.
According to the reports of CEP, Shane and Spicer (1983) found significant
positive correlation between environmental and financial performance. In other
words, companies who have a poor pollution control record suffer a more
negative stock return than those with a high ranking. Thus authors believe
13
investors react differently to different companies on the grounds of past pollution
control records and pollution control expenditure.
However, with a larger sample size and time period, Mahapatras (1984)
conclusion is completely opposite to both Spicer (1978) and Shane and Spicer
(1983). The results of the tests prove investors are rational, but not ethical.
Investors do not reward the companies for socially responsible behavior which
does not make incentives for companies to spend on pollution control and to have
socially desirable behavior. Similarly, Jaggi and Freedman (1992) found supported
evidence afterwards.
Since prior researches are based on data nearly 40 years old, and objective
environmental performance criteria is uncertain, it is difficult to judge and apply
to current economic situation. Some scholars (e.g. Hamilton, 1995; Konar and
Cohen,1997; Connors and Silva-Gao, 2008) began to investigated capital market
response to the publication of the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) since early
1990s. TRI is a publicly available dataset which includes companies waste
management activities and situation about toxic chemical releases reported
annually by industries. Hamilton (1995) publishes the first study testing capital
market reaction to the first 1989 TRI release. The results indicate that
stockholders in firms which submit relatively higher pollution figures in TRI
reports are more likely experienced negative statistically significant abnormal
returns, with an average loss of $4.1 million in market value on the pollution
figures release day. Consistent with Hamilton (1995), Konar and Cohen (1997)
conclude similar results. Besides, they found that the abnormal returns force the
companies to improve their environmental performance in the future. 40 firms
with largest losses due to the first release of TRI data display lower pollution
figures in the next three years. Evidence also demonstrates that in some industries,
if companies report decreased levels of toxic releases, the abnormal returns are
less negative on the day of accouchements (Connors and Silva- Gao, 2008).
14
Nevertheless, the authors point out that recent announcements do not produce as
significant stock abnormal returns as previous releases. This is perhaps because
investors have been already aware of and used to the information.
Similar researches are conducted in other countries as well. And the results are
still mixed. For example, Gupta and Goldar (2005) examine the influence of
environmental rating of large Indian firms on their stock prices. Evidence shows a
positive relationship between abnormal returns and the level of the firms
environmental performance. And environmentally unfriendly behaviours of
companies who have weak performance on environmental management cause up
to 30% negative abnormal returns. However, no significant stock price respond is
found to the published environmental management ranking within a three-day
event window in Japanese companies (Takeda and Tomozawa, 2006).
An alternative way of testing the correlation is to investigate if intra-industry stock
returns are systematically influenced by environmental catastrophes. In earlier
papers, investigations were carried out on the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear
accident (Bowen, Castinias, and Daley, 1983; Hill and Schneeweis, 1983) to
examine whether the whole industry capital market react to this disaster.
Evidence demonstrates that it primarily affects stockholders values of
nuclear-based firms at the time of the event. In the study of Bhopal explosion and
chemical release, Blacconiere and Patten (1994) found similar results to TMI
event. Market values of other companies are also negatively affected by the
disaster in the chemical industry. Hill and Schneeweis (1983) suggest that this
reaction may be attributable to the increased expected costs of operations in order
to meet the new sets of safety regulations for the same industry companies.
Furthermore, firms with superior environmental disclosures before the Bhopal
catastrophes in 1984 suffered a relatively less negative market reaction.
Researchers conclude that investors may interpret environmental disclosures as
positive signal which plays a role in assessing future regulatory costs. Heflin and
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Wallace (2011) found support evidence in the study of BP deep water horizon oil
spill disaster. Mansur, Cochran and Phillips (1991) conduct a similar research on
Exxon Valdez oil spill incident. The results also reveal capital market respond
efficiently to the arrival of new information. Besides, the market is able to
distinguish oil companies depending on their exposure to the site of the accident.
Shareholders of the firms which are less exposed or not exposed to the incident
location, experience less negative abnormal returns than shareholders of Exxon
and the more exposed companies. However, the finding also suggests that the
market does not consider this oil spill disaster having industry-wide impact.
Moreover, several studies using event study investigated stock market reaction to
the environmental violations which are related to judicial actions. Similar to other
literatures, the conclusions of this area are inconsistent as well. Muoghalu, et al.
(1990) firstly estimate the impact of penalties on firms that illegally mismanage
hazardous waste material in United States. The results of the study show that
defendant companies experience significant loss (1.2% on average) in market
value when the lawsuits become publicly available, but no significant abnormal
returns are found at the disposition of suit. Karpoff, Lott and Rankine (1998) and
Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly (2005) found a statistically significant decline in
common share values due to the announcements of environmental violations
(1.58% on average). The decreases of market values are more severe if events are
initially reported by press when the negative environmental incident occurred.
What is more, they also found that the amounts of market losses are positively
correlated to the legal penalties. This implies that expectation of lower profits in
the future due to reputational losses is not the reason resulting in share value
losses. Contrary to the developed countries, capital markets in developing countries
are not expected to react efficiently. However, investigations demonstrate
completely results. For instance, study (Dasgupta, et al. 2006) indicates that
investors in Korea strongly react to the disclosure of news about companies in
Korea breaking environmental laws and regulations. The average common share
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value loss is estimated to be much more severe than the changes in capital market
value for similar events in United States and Canada. And the more news about the
events, the larger losses the companies suffer in stock returns, reaching above 35
percent if events covered by 5 or more newspapers. Research (Dasgupta, Laplante
and Mamingi, 2001) is also conducted in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and the
Philippines. Although environmental regulations in these four countries are
enforced poorly, capital markets do react to the companies environmental
performance, experiencing significant negative abnormal stock returns when bad
environmental news or violation activities are publicly available.
On the other hand, Laplante and Lanoie (1994) carried out a research among
Canadian companies, using a sample of 47 events which are divided into four
categories: violations of environmental regulations, lawsuits, suit settlements and
investments in antipollution equipment. The findings indicate market value of
Canadian-owned firms suffer loss (about 2%) on the day of suit settlement
instead of the news of lawsuit. The authors attribute the adverse results to less
severe enforcement of environmental regulations in Canada. Furthermore, Harper
and Adams (1996) conclude that, in general, stockholders of firms which are
named as potentially responsible in a Superfund cleanup effort do not suffer
significant negative abnormal returns.
In addition to previous strands, large numbers of scholars are more willing to
investigate the effects of public disclosure of corporate environmental
performance on common share value. The sources of the performance are usually
adopted from public news or corporate financial report. Since public disclosure
always reveals both sides of corporate practices, it is convenient for researchers
to examine the impact on financial performance from either pollution abatement
performance or pollution accidents.
There has been a debate on how the environmental abatement or pollution
control information affects firm market value for several decades. In general, the
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controversy is divided into two schools: value creation school and cost concerned
school (Hassel et al, 2005). The value creation school considers environmental
efforts contribute firms to be more competitive in the long run even if they reduce
company profits in short term. The development of pollution abetment equipment
may decrease the frequency of negative environmental events and make the
pollution accidents to be more easily controlled than other firms without too
much environmental efforts. This competitive advantage can improve financial
returns to the investors in the future. Therefore, high level of environmental
performance is expected to be positive correlated to corporate capital market
returns. This relationship is also confirmed by empirical studies. For instance,
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) seek out 140 positive events between 1985 and
1991 from NEXIS database of newswire services using keywords environmental
and award. With this sample, they find that the first-time revealed award
information is associated with greater increase in stock valuation. Dasgupta et, al.
(1998) publish supporting evidence in word bank report after they investigating
the situations in developing countries. Due to the weak monitoring and
enforcement of regulations, firms in such countries are generally considered have
no incentives in environmental efforts. But when firms invest in pollution
abatement activities, it reveals that capital markets do react positively to them in
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and the Philippines.
On the other hand, cost concerned school argues that high level of environmental
performance means large expenditures or costs which lead to lower earnings and
lower stock prices. This makes firms less attractive than others to the investors.
As a consequence, capital market may have insignificant reaction or even negative
response to this kind of news. Lorraine, Collison and Power (2004) find evidence
in a UK context to support the theory. Company environmental award
information is selected from articles in the press releases, like the Financial Times,
between 1995 and 2000. And the results show that good news events produce
little abnormal returns in capital markets. Thus, the stock market reaction is small
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to corporate high environmental. Chan and Milne (1999) report similar results
that investors react insignificantly to better corporate environmental
performance disclosed in the annual reports. Besides, Hassel et al (2005) conclude
a negative relationship between pollution control performance and the market
value with a Swedish company sample. High level of environmental performance
is not attractive at least from the views of Swedish investors.
Not only concerning about the impact of pollution abatement development,
researchers also focus on how negative environmental accidents affect firm
market value (e.g. Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Word bank report, 1998; Chan
and Milne 1999; Lorraine, Collison and Power, 2004). Even though most of
empirical studies conclude a positive relationship between negative events (e.g.
Capelle-Blancard and laguna, 2010) and corporate financial performance, some
researchers find a neutral result as well (e.g. Jones and Rubin, 2001).
More specifically, in the same study by Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), they
investigate the impact of bad news events using keywords related to pollution,
such as oil spill, gas leak and explosion. Significant negative stock returns are
documented for the sample events, with on average 390 million losses for spills
and other accidents. Chan and Milnes research (1999) also indicates that
investors react strongly and negatively to the poor activities after examining the
environmental disclosure in corporate annual report. Besides, evidence implies
that firms with more pollution disclosure suffer more strongly and negatively
than firms with less pollution report. Similar results are concluded from other
investigations which are carried out in other countries, such as the United
Kingdom (Lorraine, Collison and Power, 2004) and developing countries (World
Bank Report, 1998). However, in the UK context, the authors argue that even
though stock market does react to the bad environmental news, there is a time lag
between the event date and actual abnormal returns produced. To put it another
way, stock market does not react immediately to the news. It produces significant
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negative returns 7 days later than the actual event date. Meanwhile, evidences of
some empirical studies report insignificant abnormal returns during the
investigation period. For instance, Jones and Rubin (2001) select 73 negative
environmental events as a sample data that are reported in the Wall Street Journal
within electric power companies or oil firms over the period of 1970 to 1992. But
the results demonstrate that the overall stock market response insignificantly to
the sample accidents. According to the outcomes, the authors argue that firms are
only punished when the negative performance really harm the benefits of their
customers or suppliers.
3. Research Methodology
3.1 Event Study Methodology
Previous studies have tried to argue the relationship between corporate social
performance and financial performance using various methodologies. Konar and
Cohen (2001) employ Tobins q and find that poor environmental activities are
negatively correlated with the intangible asset value of firms. Elsayed and Paton
(2005) argue that there is a neutral impact of environmental performance on firm
market value with static and dynamic panel data evidence. Besides, many
researchers adopt meta-analysis to examine the effect of CSP on firm financial
performance (e.g. Marc and John, 2001; Orlitzky and Schmidt, 2003; Van De Velde
et, al, 2005). However, meta-analysis methodology requires satisfying several
issues at the same time in order to ensure the validity of outcomes, such as
precise definitions of objectives, proper evaluation of heterogeneity and use of
sensitivity analysis (Walker and Kattan, 2008). These requirements limit the
feasibility in some cases. Therefore, most researchers are inclined to employ
event study methodology to examine the impact of social performance on the
common stock market, although the results are still inconclusive (e.g. Klassen and
McLaughlin, 1996; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010; Lorraine et al. 2004;
Karoff, Lott and Rankine, 1998; Jaggi and Freedman, 1992 etc.).
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In fact, since the first study by Fama et al (Fama, Fisher et al, 1969), event study
has become the standard method of measuring capital market reaction to
particular announcement or event. On the whole, event study has been used for
two major reasons (Binder, 1998). The first one is to measure the market
efficiency in relation to the new information. According to the assumptions of
efficient capital market, when information related to the company performance is
publicly available, stock prices probably produce changes or abnormal returns.
Besides, it is also able to investigate the impact of a specific event on the corporate
shareholders values if capital market does react to the information.
In the literature of this methodology, Brockett et al. (1995) and MacKinlay (1997)
provide a comprehensive review of the procedure and key considerations of event
studies. In general, the first step is to determine the length of estimation window
and event window. As illustrated in Figure 1, T=0 is defined as the event date, the
first day of event window as T1+1 and the ending day as T2.And the estimation
window represents from T0+1 to T1. Thus the length of estimation window (L1)
equals to T1-T0 and event window (L2) equals to T2-T1.
Figure 1 Event Study Time Line
When detecting the impact of environmental performance on capital market value,
there is no consistent with the length of event window. For instance, Klassen and
McLaughlin (1996) use a 21-day event window, while Capelle-Blancard and
Laguna (2010) with a 41-day event window. Although both of these two surveys
found similar results, MacKinlay (1997) emphasize the importance of identifying
the investigation period in order to make sure there are no confounding events
happened influencing the effect of event during the event window. In other words,
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researchers have to control other factors potential impact so that the effect of the
specific event on the firms share values can be isolated as much as possible. Only
in this way can the investigators ensure that the remaining residual return is
correlated to the unique event.
McWilliams, Siegel and Teoh (1999) point out that if large numbers of research
companies in the sample adopted from related or the same industries,
industry-specific factors will be a problem as clustering phenomenon may occur.
Since companies cluster in one or several industries, the stock returns are likely
to be correlated among firms in the same industry. The literature also suggests
that a long event window, such as 41 trading days, can increase the probability of
confounding events, especially with a small sample. Under this situation, only
using the market index is not sufficient. Teoh et al. (1999) provide one method to
extract the industry factor. They use equally weighted portfolios of all firms to
match four-digit SIC codes, excluding the investigated firms. If the SIC codes are
not matched, the equally weighted market portfolio can be employed.
Another clustering phenomenon is that event dates concentrates in calendar
time. Peterson (1989) suggests this kind of events probably take place when tax
law changes, accounting method changes or new governmental regulation issued.
As a result, the variance of the abnormal returns increase which makes it less
liable to detect stock market reactions.
The most convenient way of removing the clustering effect is to limit the length
of event window (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). This is because efficient capital
market is the primary assumption of the event study methodology. To put it
another way, if the market works efficiently, the stock price of the firm should
almost immediately response to the new information. For instance, Wright and
Ferris (1997) report common stock market reacts significantly to the
announcement of corporate business plan on the event date (day 0). Teoh et al
(1999) find the disclosure of corporate social activities produce significantly
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abnormal returns between 1 day before the event date and 1 day after the event
(i.e. days -1, 0 and 1).
Therefore, an 11-day event window is adopted in my event study to examine the
impact of negative environmental events on corporate capital market. In other
words, the event window begins from 5 days prior to the event date and ends to
5days after the event date (i.e. (-5, 5)). The significances of the abnormal returns
in some intervals are also examined within the event window, like (-3, 3), (-1, 1)
(0, 1) and (0, 2). The purpose of the tests is to find out a more accurate market
response to the event. What is more, following other event studies (e.g. MacKinly,
1997; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010); a period of 250 prior trading days (i.e.
Day -255 to Day -6) is used as estimation window to predict normal return
The core concept of event studies is to examine the effect of the information on
stock price. If the new information does have influence on capital market,
abnormal returns can be reflected from the responsible companies common
stocks. The raw daily prices were downloaded from Yahoo Finance, and share
return is calculated as:
(1)
where RjT is the stock return for firm j on day T and PjT represents the price of
firm j on day T.
The abnormal return is defined as the actual stock return minus the normal
return over the event window period (i.e. in the 11-day period from day T-5 to day
T+5). And the normal return is the expected or predicted stock return without
the event information. This concept can be interpreted by the following formula:
(2)
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where ARiT is the abnormal stock return for day T (T-5, T+5), event i and E (RiT) is
the predicted stock return (i.e. normal return) for day T (T-5, T+5), event i.
In the history of event studies, there are three common models to calculate the
expected return, constant mean return model, market model and capital asset
pricing model (CAPM). Compare to constant mean return model, market model
removes the part of the return which is influenced by variation in the market
return. By reducing the variance of the unexpected return, it can increase the
ability to investigate the event effect. As for the CAPM model, even though this
method is prevalent in event studies during 1970s, it is found that there exists
deviation in the model (Fama and French, 1996). Therefore, it is questionable
about the validity of the restrictions imposed by CAPM on the market model and
the results of the researches may be sensitive to different CAPM limitations
(MacKinly, 1997). Reviewing recent literature, researchers always apply market
model to examine the predicted return. It is statistically relates the specific stock
returns to the return of market portfolio. This correlation can be expressed by a
simple linear formula:
(3)ȽiȾi are estimated from estimation window (i.e. from day T-255 to day
T-6) and RmTǤɂiT is random disturbance to the event
i for target firms stock return at day T. And the market return is calculated from
the typical market portfolio, Standard & Poors 500 Index.
(4)
According to formula (2) and (3), it is easy to obtain the final equation of
abnormal returns:
(5)
var( )
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Ǧ ? ? ?Ǥ ?Ƚi ?Ⱦi are ordinary least squares (OLS)Ƚi Ⱦi.
In general, event studies usually employ two time series of stock return data with
the purpose of estimating unexpected returns for each event. Stock market index,
like S&P 500, is used to assess the parameters of the market model in the
estimation window and to predict the expected returns during the event period.
Hence, the abnormal return is the difference between the predicted return and
the actual stock return of the responsible firm for each event.
For each event, the individual stocks abnormal returns can be aggregated
through the event window. Given N events, the average abnormal return (AAR) in
event period is defined as:
(6)
(7)
where t=T-5, T-4,  , T+4, T+5 and i represents each event.
According to the above formulas, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR)
can be aggregated through any range in event window, which is expressed as:
(8)
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(9)
where (t1, t2) is the interval in the event window (i.e. T1 ? ?أ1أ2أ2).
When testing the statistical significance of the unexpected returns, event studies
assume that abnormal returns for event i in any interval are independent and
identically distributed. On the basis of this assumption, CAAR is also independent
over time. Hence, the statistical significance of any range (t1, t2) in the event
window can be examined using a t-test:
(10)
At last, least squares regressions using White standard errors is employed to test
the statistical significance of cumulative average abnormal returns for all
companies which are treated as a group. This step also makes sure the
generalized least squares estimator is the minimum variance, correcting the
problem of heteroskedasticity (Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2011).
After testing the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns for each event, I
am wondering whether other casual factors contribute to these observed
abnormal returns. Therefore, cross-sectional analysis is employed to analyze
the event study results. In order to identify factors that may influence the
environmental performance on firm capital market value, the (0, 1) interval CAAR
for all events are regressed on some potentially explanatory variables. Referring
to previous similar studies, firm distinct characteristics and event specific factors
are the most possible explanatory variables that may have impact on the
abnormal returns.
In the regression model, firm size and gearing ratio are included to explore
whether the differences between firm levels contribute to the event study results.
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According to some theoretical and empirical studies, the positive relationship
between corporate social performance and financial performance is always
influenced by a third factor that is related to the firm accounting level (King and
Lenox, 2001).
For instance, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) report the significance of
controlling the size of firms when explaining the stock abnormal returns
produced by chemical disasters. In their study, firm size is measured by the
natural logarithm of firm market value on the day before the accident. Konar and
Cohen (2001) find that bad environmental information has a significantly
negative correlation to the firm size (measured by intangible firm assets plus
replacement value of firm assets) after controlling for other factors that
traditionally thought to explain firm market value. King and Lenox (2001)
emphasize that the effect of corporate environmental performance on capital
market is attribute to the firm level differences, like firm size (represented by the
natural logarithm of total assets)and gearing ratio (the ratio of total debt to total
assets). Waddock and Graves (1997) and McWilliams and Siegel (2000) suggest
that gearing ratio can represent firm risk to some extent. If firms have a relatively
higher gearing ratio, they probably have a higher risk of bankruptcy when suffer
negative events.
Following most of the literature (e.g. King and Lenox, 2001; Elsayed and Paton,
2005), firm size here is measured by total assets. Since the distribution of firm
total assets is unlikely to be normally distributed, I use the natural logarithm of
total assets as proxy for the firm size. And gearing ratio is calculated as the ratio
of total debt to total equity.
The severity of the harmful environmental accidents is usually considered to be
other control variables in the cross-sectional analysis (e.g. Lorraine, Collison and
Power, 2004; Jones and Rubin, 2001). Therefore, the dummy variables of toxic
release and explosion are used to explore whether event specific factors
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contribute to the cumulative average abnormal returns.
Finally, the event type is also added into the model as another explanatory variable
to test if capital market reacts differently to the different types (i.e. chemical
release, gas leak and oil spill) of negative environmental events.
As a consequence, the cross-sectional regression model can be expressed as:
(11)
where
lnsize = natural logarithm of firm total assets.
gearing = the ratio of total debt to total equity.
toxic = 1 if the negative environmental events involves toxic material release,
= 0 otherwise.
explosion = 1 if the negative environmental events involves explosion,
= 0 otherwise.
type = 1 if the negative environmental event is chemical release event,
= 2 if the negative environmental event is gas leak event,
= 3 if the negative environmental event is oil spill event.
The list of incidents and the firm accounting features are presented in Table 1.
(See next page)
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Table 1 Details of Negative Environmental Events and Firm Specific Features
Date Firm
Dummy =1
if Toxic
Release
Dummy =1 if
Explosion
Type* lnsize*
Gearing
Ratio*
27-01-00 MRO 1 0 3 9.78 49.12
07-02-00 SUN 1 0 3 8.57 68.33
22-02-00 HES 0 0 2 8.95 76.04
08-03-00 RDS 1 1 2 10.34 37.91
07-04-00 POM 1 0 3 8.84 160.13
12-06-00 BP 1 1 1 11.4 32.8
19-06-00 CVX 1 1 2 11.23 64.47
30-08-00 SUN 1 0 2 8.57 68.33
11-12-00 XOM 0 1 1 11.88 29.94
16-01-01 MRO 0 0 2 9.75 32.01
31-01-01 GE 1 0 2 12.99 3.53
14-03-01 VLO 1 0 3 8.37 68.24
25-06-01 RDS 1 1 3 10.43 18.73
16-07-01 TOT 1 1 1 11.66 48.03
21-09-01 TOT 1 1 1 11.66 48.03
08-04-02 BP 1 0 3 11.86 28.6
05-07-02 EEP 1 0 3 7.41 115.86
13-01-03 MRO 0 0 1 9.79 89.94
21-01-03 COP 1 0 1 11.25 66.96
21-02-03 XOM 0 1 1 11.94 14.34
29-05-03 RDS 1 0 2 11.94 23.5
11-09-03 RDS 1 0 2 11.94 23.5
22-10-03 CVX 1 0 2 11.26 51.52
04-12-03 CVX 1 0 3 11.26 51.52
05-01-04 SSL 0 1 2 9.14 42.37
28-04-04 KMP 1 0 3 9.12 123.01
14-09-04 SSL 1 1 2 9.14 42.37
17-09-04 BP 1 0 3 12.24 23.73
13-10-04 COP 1 0 3 11.32 51.74
29-11-04 MRO 0 0 2 9.88 71.72
29-11-04 STO 1 0 2 10.3 49.45
26-01-05 SSL 1 0 2 9.38 46.58
23-03-05 BP 0 1 1 12.29 28.09
28-03-05 COP 0 0 3 11.44 35.11
12-04-05 STO 1 0 3 10.48 39.64
12-07-05 ECA 0 0 2 10.35 54.72
30-08-05 MUR 1 0 3 8.6 25.07
19-09-05 SUN 1 0 2 9 92.22
To be Continued
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Continued
Date Firm
Dummy =1
if Toxic
Release
Dummy =1 if
Explosion
Type* lnsize*
Gearing
Ratio*
14-11-05 PTR 1 1 1 11.28 17.97
22-11-05 STO 1 0 3 10.48 39.64
13-02-06 CVX 1 0 3 11.74 20.48
02-03-06 BP 1 0 3 12.24 23.73
20-03-06 EEP 1 0 3 8.4 125.67
12-06-06 BPL 0 0 3 7.5 54
08-09-06 BP 1 0 3 12.24 23.73
04-10-06 VLO 1 0 1 10.4 33.95
26-12-06 PAA 1 0 3 8.32 99.95
19-01-07 COP 1 0 2 12.01 32.83
02-02-07 EEP 1 0 3 8.56 102.63
12-12-07 STO 1 0 3 10.71 27.18
06-03-08 APA 1 1 2 10.26 27.49
28-08-08 RDS 1 1 3 12.5 14.6
17-09-08 BP 0 0 2 12.37 32.8
13-10-08 ECA 1 1 2 10.76 46.09
06-05-09 KMP 1 1 3 9.79 141.65
10-11-09 BP 1 0 2 12.34 36.05
23-11-09 ECA 1 0 2 10.76 39.2
04-12-09 VLO 0 1 1 10.45 39.75
06-04-10 BP 1 0 1 12.37 33.91
20-04-10 BP 1 1 3 12.37 33.91
03-05-10 XOM 1 0 3 12.36 8.69
26-07-10 EEP 1 0 3 9.1 93.91
10-09-10 PCG 0 1 2 10.67 118.73
29-04-11 PAA 1 0 3 9.53 130.26
01-07-11 XOM 0 0 3 12.62 10.22
05-07-11 COP 1 0 3 11.96 34.14
12-08-11 RDS 1 0 3 12.68 29.6
08-11-11 CVX 1 0 3 12.13 10.86
22-12-11 RDS 1 0 3 12.68 29.6
28-02-08 RDS 0 1 2 12.5 14.6
*type=1 if it is chemical release event; type=2 if it is gas leak event, type=3 if it is oil
spill event.
*lnsize = natural logarithm of firm total assets.
*gearing ratio = the ratio of total debt to total equity
At last, although event study has been widely employed to analyze the effect of
new information on common stock market, this methodology still has some
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unavoidable limitations. Firstly, event studies primarily depend on the assumption
of an efficient market. Therefore, capital market should response immediately to
related event information. However, this assumption is not always valid in some
cases. For example, Lorraine, Collison and Power (2004) report a time lag of
market reaction to the negative environmental news in the UK context. Significant
abnormal returns are not generated until 7 days after the news publicly available.
Besides, the application of stock-market-based measurement indicates that
investors assess corporate management ability in a proper performance measure.
As the overall performance contains multiple fields, one accident may not be
sufficient to alter investors evaluations to the firms (Schneeweis, et al. 1988). The
short investigation period is the last shortcoming of event study methodology.
Many literatures emphasize the importance of limiting the length of event window
in case confounding events take place (e.g. MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams, Siegel
and Teoh, 1999; Binder, 1998). Therefore, when the durations of the events last
more than two days or a disaster event happens, it is unable to analyze long-term
influence of the events on firm financial performance, which is always criticized
by some researchers (e.g. Konar and Cohen, 2001). For instance, the accident of
BP deepwater horizon oil spill last over 2 months. And BP stock prices decline
greater than 50% in the period of the event. But the most significant drops
emerge in May and June instead of the beginning of the event (Heflin andWallace,
2011). Therefore, it is impossible for event study to analyze the complete
influence of such event, especially in the long term.
3.2 Sample of Data
On the whole, the information of corporate environmental performance is usually
from public disclosure, such as public announcement, newspaper and corporate
financial report. Following the study of Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010), a
search was carried out with the software Factiva. This software is a business
information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company, which provides
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all major newspaper, magazines, and radio transcripts in the world, such as The
Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal. The negative environmental events
were identified from keywords oil spill, chemical release and gas leak along
with the words explosion and toxic, reported on major business newspaper.
The sample period for the negative activities was covered from 2000 to 2011,
lasting 11 years. And the industries of the accident company were limited within
two sectors, oil & gas and energy industries. In order to examine the market
efficiency in relation to these poor environmental practices, only publicly traded
firms which are listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were taken into
account. From the news information, it is found that some events were difficult to
detect the accurate occurring time, such as oil spill from underground pipeline.
Hence, the event dates are the days the accidents were discovered, only except
Bohai oil spill. This oil spill in fact began on 4th June, 2011. However, since it was
withheld by Chinese State Oceanic Administration, the news of this accident was
not publicly reported until 31 days later on 5th July, 2011.With the purpose of
detecting capital market reaction to the event, the public disclosure date is
regarded as the event date for this accident. Moreover, other features about the
events are also available from the public news, such as explosion and toxic
situations.
Using these selection criteria, I started with 78 events. Of these, 8 events were
eliminated as the accidents happened before the company publicly traded on
NYSE. As a result, 25 companies were finally remained, responsible for 70
negative environmental events (for the details of accidents, see Table 1), including
12 chemical release accidents, 24 gas leak and 34 oil spill accidents. The stock
prices were downloaded from Yahoo Finance. And Standard and Poor 500 Index (S
& P 500) was employed to remove the part of the return which is influenced by
variation in the market return (Brockett et al., 1994). What is more, other
information is also collected in the research in order to test whether event
specificity and firm characteristics have impact on the stock abnormal returns.
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The details of the sample events are available from the news reports, such as toxic
release and explosion situation. The accounting features of each firm are obtained
from their annual reports which are publicly available from the official website.
3.3 Theoretical Background
One of purpose of using event study methodology is to measure whether capital
market response to new information in relation to corporate performance (Binder,
1998). According to the assumptions of market efficiency, when such information
is publicly available, stock prices should produce significant changes or abnormal
returns in the event period. At the mean time, researchers also attempt to find out
why the unexpected returns are produced when these accidents have taken place.
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) find significant negative returns when firms with
weak environmental management are responsible for environmental crisis. The
average stock market value decrease 390 million dollars, equal to -$0.70 per share.
Major losses are considered to be the following clean-up expenditures and
settlement of related legal suits. Even though part of damages can be covered by
insurance, the authors argue that the loss of customer goodwill and public trust
may affect firms future profitability. In other words, corporate reputation on
environmental performance may affect the amount of market value reduction.
Capelle_Blancard and Laguna (2010) examine the effect of 64explosions in
chemical plants over the period of 1990 to 2005. When the disasters are publicly
reported, firms on average experience 1.3% losses in market value in the
following two days. In the literature, reputation is regarded as one of the reasons
caused abnormal returns. When the firms experience a small numbers of similar
accidents previously, common share values of those firms suffer a relatively lower
losses compared to the firms whose previous accident number is high. One
possible explanation of this result is that investors may attribute the accident to
bad luck for the firms with relatively good environmental performance. If firms
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have bad related records, they may have higher level of risk to suffer such costly
events. Under this situation, investors may reevaluate this kind of companies faith
and their management skills. As a result, the firm reputation is strongly damaged.
In addition, the results demonstrate that the equity value varies with the severity
of the accidents which is measured by chemical release situation and the number
of damaged fatalities and serious injuries. The more human costs of an accident,
the larger losses the shareholders suffer.
Karpoff, Lott and Rankine (1998) also report a statistically significant decline in
common share values due to the announcements of environmental violations
(1.58% on average). Besides, the researchers try to examine the reputation effect
on the market value reduction as well. But they find that reputational loss is not
significantly related to share value decline as the amounts of market losses are
positively correlated to the legal penalties. This implies that abnormal returns are
parallel with the amount of fines and penalties issued by the government.
Similar investigation is carried out in the UK context by Lorraine, Collison and
Power (2004). However, the results show that common stock market only
responses to the environmental news associated with penalized fines. Other
explanatory variables are not able to explain variations in capital market reactions,
like environmental performance news (no matter good or bad) and sector
membership. It is worth noting that a time lag is found between the event date
and actual abnormal returns produced in this study. Stock market does not react
immediately to the news. It produces significant negative returns 7 days later than
the actual event date take places.
What is more, some researchers attempt to analyze the large losses caused by
environmental catastrophe, like Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Bhopal chemical release
disaster. Evidence shows that Union Carbide suffers 27.9% market value
reduction, approximately 1 billion dollars (Blacconiere and Patten 1994).
Meanwhile, its industry rivals also experience about 1.28% loss because of this
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event. The authors discuss that the whole intra-industry losses may result from
two possible reasons. The first one is that investors may reevaluate the possible
production-side risks. And the other one is the increased regulatory exposure.
After Bhopal disaster, companies are requested to disclose more details for their
environmental management. Firms with weak related management have to spend
more for regulation in the future which lead to stock price drop during the event
period.
In contrast, several studies report insignificant abnormal returns response to the
negative environmental performance. For instance, Laplante and Lanoies (1994)
carry out a research among Canadian companies using a sample of 47 events with
respect to violations of environmental regulations. The findings indicate that
market values of Canadian-owned firms do not suffer losses from the
announcements of environmental violations or lawsuits unless these suits are
actually implement. Facing to the findings, the authors attribute the adverse
results to relatively loose enforcement of environmental regulations in Canada.
Support evidence is reported by Hones and Rubin (2001). 73 negative
environmental events are selected from the Wall Street Journal in electric power
and oil industries from1970 to 1992. The stock market response is overall
insignificant to the sample events either regulatory or non-regulatory. The
authors argue that investors are rational rather than ethical. Even though these
events may affect firms reputation, they probably do not influence the quality of
their output or their reputations with employees or suppliers. Thus, the events
that produce large losses are usually those directly harm their contractual
partners. Under this situation, investors expect these partners will punish firms
for the harms.
On the whole, five factors are discussed in previous studies resulting in market
value reduction with respect to negative environmental events. The first one is
facility and human costs, such as injuries and facility damaged. Following clean-up
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expenditure, like collecting spilled oil, is another consideration. If the cause of
negative events relates to violations of environmental regulations, panelized fines
are regarded as the force driving the stock price decrease. When environmental
catastrophe takes place, the common share values decline significantly because of
industry risk revisions by investors and increased regulatory costs. The last factor
is reputation effect. As corporate reputation damaged, firms may have risk of
suffering larger market value losses than the counterparts. However, the effect of
reputational loss is inconsistent.
On the other hand, capital market is probably response to the poor environmental
performance insignificantly. Some researchers attribute this result to the loose
enforcement of state environmental regulations, such as in Canada. Other authors
argue that investors are rational rather than ethical. Corporate stockholders may
suffer value losses only when the negative events actually harm the firms
contractual partners. Then, investors expect that firms may be punished by their
partners which probably produce costs in the future.
According to the above theories, it is expected that negative abnormal returns are
produced when bad environmental information is publicly available. Therefore,
the first two tested hypotheses are (all hypotheses here are stated as alternative
forms):
H1: There is a relationship between corporate negative environmental events and
that firms market value.
H2: Negative environmental events are associated with a decrease in the firms
market value.
Finally, firm distinct characteristics and event specific factors are included in the
cross-sectional analysis as possible explanatory variables which may have impact
on the cumulative average abnormal returns. Therefore, the alternative
hypothesis is:
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H3: Firm size, gearing ratio, toxic release, explosion and event type contribute to
the generated abnormal returns.
4. Data Analysis and Results Discussion
4.1 The Impact of Negative Events on Stock Returns
Table 2 Description of Abnormal Returns in Event Window
T Mean Median S.D Sum
-5 -0.00104 -0.00062 0.015808 -0.07463
-4 -0.00145 -0.00105 0.018995 -0.10472
-3 -0.00533 -0.00381 0.01433 -0.38367
-2 -0.00178 0.000877* 0.020104 -0.12803
-1 0.003099* 0.000902* 0.01986 0.223144*
0 -0.00487 -0.00391 0.013788 -0.35041
1 -0.00252 -0.00032 0.023192 -0.18168
2 -0.00174 -0.00127 0.018469 -0.1254
3 0.005132* 0.002117* 0.017077 0.369531*
4 0.000963* -0.00105 0.019247 0.069322*
5 -0.00093 0.000065* 0.017442 -0.06676
*Abnormal Returns > 0
Figure 2 Average Abnormal Returns of Each Day in Event Window
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Table 2 describes some statistics of the abnormal returns in event window (i.e. 5
days prior to the event date and 5days after the event date). From the view of the
mean value, most of days have negative abnormal returns during the event period.
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Day -3 generates 0.53% negative abnormal returns which is the greatest loss in
the 11-day window, and day 0 (i.e. event date) produces the second greatest
abnormal returns on average (-0.49%). On the contrast, positive abnormal
returns are also generated in day -1 (0.31%), day 3 (0.51%) and day 4 (0.1%).
Figure 2 provides a more direct illustration for the changes of average abnormal
returns of each day in the event window. It is easy to find that the common stock
market reacts strongly and immediately, when the events take place. Compare to
the abnormal returns on day -1 (1 day prior to the event date), the stock returns
decreases dramatically, almost 0.8% on the accident day. After the accident,
negative abnormal returns are also generated in the following two days.
From the median point of view, day -3 and event date also have two highest
negative abnormal returns, which are -0.38% and -0.39%, respectively. Compare
to the average abnormal returns, more positive abnormal returns emerge under
this situation. They are also produced in day -2 (0.088%) and day 5 (0.006%)
except for day -1 and day 3. But these two values are very minor. When
aggregating the abnormal returns across the whole events for each investigated
day, it is clear to see that the results are almost the same as those that are found
from mean and median perspectives. Day -3 and event date generated the two
greatest negative abnormal returns and day -1 and day 3 have relatively high
positive abnormal returns on the whole.
Besides, average abnormal returns of each day are always aggregated (i.e.
cumulative average abnormal returns) during the event period in order to detect
the overall capital market response to the negative events. According to Figure 3,
the sudden harmful environmental events generate negative cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAAR) from the beginning of the event window to the end of
the event time. Even though the CAAR fluctuated widely, the overall trend is
downward. More specifically, the amount of CAAR decreases gradually from -0.1%
to -1.56% in the first eight days (i.e. 5 days prior to the event date and 2 days after
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the event date) except for day -1. When the accident information is publicly
available, the stock market produces a sharp drop (-0.49%), almost the greatest
loss in the event period. This decline continues in the following two days and the
CAAR reached to the bottom (-1.56%) on the second day after the accident. Then,
the amount of CAAR rises up little by little in the final three days of the event
window. Hence, the effects of the accidents seem to become weak.
Figure 3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) in Event Window
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Table 3 Summary of Results for Various Intervals in Event Window
Significance of CAAR
for All Events
(-5,5) (-3,3) (-1,1) (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,5)
Significantly positive
to significantly
negative ratio*
3:1 3:3 5:7 3:1 8:16 1:6 2:3
Total positive to total
negative ratio
35:45 37:43 36:44 35:45 35:45 38:42 41:39
CAAR (%) for various
intervals
-1.046 -0.801 -0.429 -0.739 -0.913 -0.400 -0.396
Robust t-statistics** -1.76 -2.11 -1.44 -2.48 -2.8 -1.49 -1.12
(p-value) 0.083 0.038 0.155 0.016 0.007 0.140 0.268
* Significant at 5% level
** White Standard errors (robust) are used to correct the heteroskedasticity
In the section of research methodology, formula (10) provides the method to test
the statistical significance of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for
each event in any intervals. According to this formula, Table 3 reports a summary
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of the results for different intervals in the event window (for original details, see
Appendices A). It is clear to see that CAAR are produced most in the interval (0, 2).
In other words, most of the significant negative abnormal returns are generated
in the following two days after the accidents take place. Since the statistical
significance of formula (10) is unable to make sure the generalized least squares
estimator is the minimum variance, White standard errors is employed for
correcting the heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, it is also able to test the
significance of CAAR for all events treated as a group. The last two rows of Table 3
reports the results after correcting the standard errors (the original results, see
Appendices B). The p-values for intervals (-3, 3) (0, 1) and (0, 2) are less than 0.05
(0.038, 0.016 and 0.006, respectively), demonstrating that common stock market
produce significant negative CAAR in these three intervals. Since day -1 reports a
relatively high amount of positive abnormal returns (0.31%), the CAAR of interval
(-1, 1) shows an insignificant result.
As I have analyzed previously, stock market produce a sharp drop on the accident
day and the CAAR reached to the bottom on the second day after the accident.
Hence, there is reason to believe that the capital market does react immediately
and significantly to the harmful environmental accident information, especially in
the following two days after the events are publicly available. As a consequence,
common stock market is considered to be efficient in my study, which is contrast
to Lorraine, Collison and Powers (2004) finding. It is confirmed that capital
market has a quick response to the publicly published negative information
rather than showing a time lag between market reaction and accident
announcement. This result is consistent with other studies, such as Wright and
Ferris (1997), Teoh et al (1999), Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) and Klassen
and McLaughlin (1996). Even though Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010)
attempt to analyze the impact of chemical disaster on stock market in the long
run, the short term evidence still provides support that CAAR are negative and
significant at the 5 % level on the event date and in the following day.
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On the whole, the results in my study report evidence to support H1 and H2. It is
confirmed that there is a relationship between corporate negative environmental
events and that firms market value. The capital market reacts quickly and
strongly to these accidents information. Negative cumulative average abnormal
returns are produced through the event time. Shareholders suffer 1.56% loss on
the second day after the event. Besides, the CAAR are statistically significant at the
5% level in the interval of accident day and the following two days.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis
The above event study results suggest that responsible firms for the harmful
environmental events experience significant negative abnormal returns over the
following two days when the bad information is publicly available. Faced with
these outcomes, I am wondering what factors may contribute to these observed
abnormal returns. Referring to previous investigations (e.g. Jones and Rubin,
2001; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010), five explanatory variables are adopted,
relating to firm characteristics and the severity of the accidents. A summary of the
possible explanatory factors is reported in Table 4.
Table 4 Descriptions of Explanatory Variables
·toxic = 1 if there is toxic release in the accident
·explosion = 1 if explosion takes place in the accident
·type = 1 represents chemical release accident
·type = 2 represents gas leak accident
·type = 3 represents oil spill accident
As we can see, there is a wide range of corporate gearing ratio (the ratio of total
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debt to total equity), varying from 3.53 to 160.13. Thus, the capital structure
varies from company to company. In addition, since the firm size is expressed by
natural logarithm of the total assets, the ln(size) values have a small difference.
But the actual corporate size (i.e. the amount of total assets) should also differ
greatly among the investigated firms. For the severity of each incident, more than
75 percent of accidents involve pollution practices, releasing toxic materials to the
surroundings. Therefore, negative environmental events involving pollutions are
more likely to happen in energy and oil & gas industries. On the contrast, less than
30 percent events involve explosion. Hence, the probability of explosion in
negative environmental incidents seems to be much lower than toxic release.
In order to examine whether these specific factors can explain the observed
abnormal returns over different firms and accidents, generalized least squares
regressions were employed, using White-corrected standard errors. I regress the
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for the (0, 1) event window on the
potentially explanatory variables for firm size, gearing ratio, toxic release,
explosion and event type. Table 5 provides the results of the explanatory
regression.
Table 5 Explanatory Regression Results
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According to the regression outcomes, it is easy to find that the p- values of most
explanatory variables are greater than 0.05 except the event type. In other words,
the observed abnormal returns are not significantly correlated to the firm size,
corporate gearing ratio, pollution performance (i.e. toxic material release) and
explosion in my research sample. However, the common stock market shows
different response to the different types of events. When gas leak incidents (type 2)
happen, the capital market produces about more 2.2% negative abnormal returns
than chemical release incidents (type 1). Meanwhile, oil spill accidents (type 3) also
make the shareholders suffer more losses (about 1.54%) than the losses
generated by chemical release (type 1).
On the other hand, the effects of firm size and gearing ratio in my study are too
minor to explain the abnormal returns, even if they are negatively related to the
CAAR. Reviewing previous studies, some researchers emphasize that firm level
differences, like gearing ratio and firm size, contribute to the effect of corporate
environmental performance on capital market (e.g. King and Lenox, 2001; Konar
and Cohen, 2001). However, many scholars also report the relationship between
corporate environmental practices and stock abnormal returns is not caused by
firm specific characteristics (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997, Klassen and
McLaughlin, 1996; Elsayed and Paton, 2005). For instance, Elsayed and Paton
(2005) argue that firm size (measured by natural logarithm of the total assets)
and gearing ratio (total debt to total assets) are insignificant explanatory variables
when explaining the impact of corporate environmental news on financial
performance. Orlitzky (2001) did an empirical survey to examine whether the
positive relationship between corporate social performance and firm financial
changes is caused by a third factor, namely firm size. But the outcomes
demonstrate that the positive correlation still exits after controlling the size of
firm. Similar to Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010), Klassen and McLaughlin
(1996) also apply the total market value of the firm on the day before the event
date to measure firm size. However, they find a conflicting result. The
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insignificant evidence implies that this confounding variable fails to explain the
observed stock market reaction to the corporate environmental performance. In
the survey of Dimson and Marsh (1986), they suggest that size effect can only
distort long- term capital market performance when using event studies. But the
effect on short-term performance is inconclusive. Waddock and Graves (1997)
also report there is no significant evidence to confirm firm size may affect the
stock abnormal returns after the corporate social performance is publicly
available. Furthermore, they find that gearing ratio is negatively related to the
capital market performance, but only significant when the variable of return on
equity is included in the cross- sectional model.
Consistent with these studies, the outcomes in my study provide support evidence
to suggest that different firm sizes and gearing ratios do not contribute to the
effect of environmental performance on firm financial performance.
The insignificance of toxic release variable implies that investors in the common
stock market do not care much about the pollution information in the harmful
environmental incidents. This result is completely opposite to the findings
reported by Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010). In their study, 64 chemical
disasters are used as the original sample, which happen in the chemical industry.
The results suggest that if the environmental accidents involve a toxic chemical
release, responsible firms do suffer greater losses than those without pollution
information. One possible reason leads to the conflicting outcomes maybe because
of the different industries that are investigated. According to their reports, there
are 15 toxic release events in the total of 64 incidents. Hence, the probability of
pollution events (less than 25%) in the chemical industry is much lower than the
possibility (more than 75%) in energy and oil & gas industries. As the pollution
performance is more likely to take place in energy and oil & gas industries,
investors may react less strongly for such information than investors in other
industries. To some extent, this result is similar to the announcement of U.S. Toxic
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Release Inventory (TRI). When the first TRI report publicly available, almost every
related firms experience significant market value reduction. Many researchers
found similar results in 1990s (e.g. Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997).
However, as time goes on, recent announcements do not produce as significant
stock abnormal returns as previous releases. Connors and Silva- Gao (2008) point
out that this is because investors may have been already aware of and used to the
information. Therefore, since investors may be aware of the relatively high risk of
toxic release in energy and oil & gas industries, the information of toxic release in
environmental accidents is unable to produce more significant abnormal returns
than those without pollution information.
5. Conclusions
This paper conducts an empirical research on the links between corporate
environmental performance and firm financial performance. More specifically, I
attempt to analyze the impact of corporate negative environmental news on the
common stock market when it is firstly published to the public. Besides, firm
distinct characteristics and event specific factors are also investigated, which may
contribute to the firm financial performance.
To do this, an original dataset of harmful events were set up in oil & gas and
energy industries, using factiva software, which provides all major newspapers
and magazines in the world. In order to examine the capital market response to
the poor environmental information, only publicly traded firms that are listed on
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were taken into account. As a result, a sample of
70 negative environmental events over the period of 2000 to 2011 were
remained , which was composed of 12 chemical release accidents, 24 gas leaks
and 34 oil spill events.
As event study is regarded as the standard method of measuring capital market
reaction to particular announcement or event, I followed previous studies and
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used this methodology to test if significant abnormal returns were generated due
to the negative information. A short 11- day event window (i.e. 5 days prior to the
event date and ends to 5days after the event date) was adopted in case too many
confounding events took place in the event period. Two series of stock return data
were used in order to estimate the unexpected returns for each event. S&P 500
index is applied to assess the parameters of the market model in the estimation
window and to predict the expected returns during the event period. And the
abnormal return is the difference between the predicted return and the actual
stock return of the responsible firm for each event.
My results indicate that the sudden harmful environmental events do generate
negative cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) from the beginning of the
event window to the end of the event time. Even though the CAAR fluctuated
widely, the overall trend is downward. And the amount of CAAR reached to the
bottom (-1.56%) on the second day after the accident. In other words,
shareholders of the responsible firms suffer on average 1.56% losses due to the
negative environmental events. In addition, statistical significances of CAAR across
all events are also tested in different intervals. The outcomes show that there are
significant negative abnormal returns in the following two days after the accidents
take place. As a consequence, there is reason to believe that the capital market
does react immediately and significantly to the harmful environmental accident
information, especially in the following two days after the events are publicly
available. And this finding is consistent with previous studies, such as Wright and
Ferris (1997), Teoh et al (1999), Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) and Klassen
and McLaughlin (1996).
After testing the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns in different
intervals, cross-sectional analysis was employed to explore whether other casual
factors contribute to these observed abnormal returns. Referring to previous
similar studies, firm size (expressed by the natural logarithm of firm total assets),
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gearing ratio (the ratio of total debt to total equity), toxic release, explosion and
event type (chemical release, gas leak and oil spill) were included in the
regression model, which represent firm distinct characteristics and event specific
factors, respectively. And the (0, 1) interval CAAR for all events are regressed on
these potentially explanatory variables.
The outcomes of the cross- sectional analysis suggest that only event type makes
a significant impact on firm abnormal returns. To put it another way, the common
stock market shows different response when receive different types of
environmental events information. Compare to the news of chemical release
incidents, the capital market produces about more 2.2% negative abnormal
returns when the gas leak incidents are published to the public. Meanwhile, oil
spill accidents also make the shareholders suffer more losses (about 1.54%) than
the losses generated by chemical release.
On the other hand, the other explanatory variables do not significantly contribute
to the changes of firm market value. According to description of the explanatory
variables, it demonstrates that corporate capital structure varies from company to
company. Both firm size and the gearing ratio differ greatly among the
investigated firms. However, the effects of firm distinct features in my study are
too minor to explain the abnormal returns, even if they are negatively related to
the CAAR. Since the effect of firm level differences has been debated for a long
period, my results provide an empirical evidence for the scholars who assert that
the correlation between corporate social performances and firm financial
performance is not related to firm specific characteristics (e.g. Waddock and
Graves, 1997, Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Elsayed and Paton, 2005). In
addition, the insignificance of toxic release variable implies that investors in the
common stock market do not care much about the pollution information in the
harmful environmental incidents. This finding is completely adverse to
Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010). One possible reason leading to the
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conflicting outcomes may be because of the different industries that are
investigated. According to the accident reports, more than 75% incidents involve
toxic material release in oil & gas and energy industries; while the percentage of
toxic pollution in the study of Capelle-Blancard and Laguna is less than 25% in
chemical industry. Therefore, investors may be aware that toxic release is more
likely to take place in energy and oil & gas industries. And they are probably less
strongly response to it than investors in other industries. Consequently, if the
pollution situation is under control, the information of toxic release in
environmental accidents may be unable to produce more significant abnormal
returns than those without pollution information.
With the purpose of preventing other confounding events take place in the period
of event time, many academics (e.g. MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams, Siegel and Teoh,
1999) emphasize the importance of limit the length of event window. Following
their suggestions, this study is unable to explore these negative environmental
accidents long- term effect on the firm common stock values, like the complete
influence of BP deep water horizon oil spill in 2010.
However, my study confirms that the harmful environmental accidents have a
significantly positive correlation with responsible firm stock returns in a short
run, especially in the following two days after the incidents are publicly available.
Besides, the outcomes also suggest that the types of events contribute to different
amount of abnormal returns. But firm distinct features and event specific factors
are not related to the market value. As many literatures focus on the news of
juridical actions due to the incidents or the ranking announcement according to
the poor environmental performance, only a few surveys pay attention to the
effect of the original accidents information. The insignificance of event specific
factors is unable to be supported by more previous studies. In any case, the
outcomes of my research still provide some arguments to enrich related
literatures and to be left for future investigations.
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Appendices
Appendices A:
Significance Tests for Different Intervals in the Event Window
event_date (-5,5) (-3,3) (-1,1) (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,5)
27-01-00 -0.40586 0.075789 0.548749 -0.40586 5.394746 0.620512 -0.00424
07-02-00 1.64334 0.713729 0.416239 1.64334 0.564531 1.927406 2.73457
22-02-00 1.470125 -0.15375 -2.5664 1.470125 -2.9497 -0.3516 0.629595
08-03-00 1.270176 0.669047 -0.04196 1.270176 -1.50087 -0.74284 0.742866
07-04-00 -0.21083 0.915714 1.810224 -0.21083 3.844541 1.481022 0.280399
12-06-00 0.012475 0.445419 0.701184 0.012475 -1.13523 -0.09996 -0.42257
19-06-00 -1.31569 -1.20142 -0.71408 -1.31569 -0.0067 -0.42946 -1.05763
30-08-00 -0.17365 0.148444 -0.63484 -0.17365 -0.82003 -0.21582 -0.02147
11-12-00 -0.59967 -0.4671 -0.21873 -0.59967 6.14342 -0.42634 0.443709
16-01-01 -0.92607 -0.76526 -1.10651 -0.92607 -9.91847 -1.38212 -0.86814
31-01-01 0.700472 1.358782 0.951368 0.700472 0.934703 1.383964 1.472877
14-03-01 -0.81831 -1.32576 -6.15993 -0.81831 -6.7361 -0.46752 -0.9019
25-06-01 -1.34642 -0.55148 -0.63802 -1.34642 -3.23532 -0.77624 -1.45975
16-07-01 -0.49808 0.272306 -1.22998 -0.49808 -0.94929 0.208597 -0.29272
21-09-01 -0.64829 -0.27305 -0.46865 -0.64829 -0.09384 1.277115 0.991833
08-04-02 -0.54354 -2.06902 -0.22723 -0.54354 -1.27385 -2.28385 -0.17274
05-07-02 -0.76397 0.154075 1.886752 -0.76397 1.409166 -0.02246 -1.05666
13-01-03 -0.43898 1.418052 3.238709 -0.43898 1.968538 2.066037 0.701496
21-01-03 1.491629 0.228736 -0.00333 1.491629 0.255505 -0.74968 0.718779
21-02-03 0.361727 1.022384 0.844145 0.361727 0.538558 0.203005 0.736056
29-05-03 -1.28445 -1.43445 -1.2656 -1.28445 -1.30202 -0.81182 -0.49696
11-09-03 -0.48041 -1.15274 -0.27226 -0.48041 -1.06019 -1.72223 -2.35424
To be continued
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Continued
event_date (-5,5) (-3,3) (-1,1) (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,5)
22-10-03 -1.43019 -0.69082 -0.67951 -1.43019 -0.41506 -1.15933 -1.88958
04-12-03 2.780472 2.534564 2.446313 2.780472 2.17624 1.704649 2.753597
05-01-04 0.71416 0.27913 0.227663 0.71416 -0.9194 -0.72004 -0.2759
28-04-04 0.01132 -0.18701 -3.22756 0.01132 -13.5703 -0.51752 -0.76492
14-09-04 2.165561 2.567924 0.914601 2.165561 -0.00318 1.000556 0.354457
17-09-04 2.0069 1.563403 3.629733 2.0069 2.1063 0.791531 1.443531
13-10-04 -0.96008 -1.70555 -0.36666 -0.96008 1.784958 -0.32247 0.113252
29-11-04 -1.07859 -1.22871 -1.23219 -1.07859 -1.11802 -1.5405 -1.85274
29-11-04 -0.43549 -0.6606 -0.98795 -0.43549 -0.73372 -1.15738 -0.87086
26-01-05 0.096138 -0.67862 -0.48007 0.096138 -0.74479 -0.66091 -0.07427
23-03-05 -0.79652 -1.85284 -1.89618 -0.79652 -11.013 -0.3654 0.396372
28-03-05 -0.57497 0.396853 -0.42142 -0.57497 -0.42585 1.205388 0.291172
12-04-05 0.110783 -1.2513 -1.3879 0.110783 -0.578 -0.56723 0.517742
12-07-05 -0.73342 -2.17216 -1.26567 -0.73342 -2.32527 -2.58271 -1.04078
30-08-05 -0.90407 -0.42829 3.776679 -0.90407 2.105324 -0.13555 -0.78044
19-09-05 0.102865 0.060144 1.262761 0.102865 0.563916 0.086194 0.201012
14-11-05 -0.0498 -0.3324 0.483679 -0.0498 1.146142 1.397632 1.471218
22-11-05 -0.05234 -0.42427 -0.09956 -0.05234 -1.87079 -3.74763 -0.9615
13-02-06 -1.0811 -0.76602 -0.72388 -1.0811 -1.00816 -0.18125 -0.23053
02-03-06 -0.6277 -0.15429 -0.43038 -0.6277 -0.17356 -0.38832 -0.18443
20-03-06 0.157678 0.738439 -0.98846 0.157678 -0.10136 1.288408 0.72322
12-06-06 -0.78227 -0.18505 -6.68373 -0.78227 -14.7542 0.263087 -0.34371
08-09-06 -1.297 -1.3981 -2.10467 -1.297 -2.10751 -0.44159 -0.60141
04-10-06 -0.21095 -0.49754 1.675506 -0.21095 0.788619 0.220272 0.833694
26-12-06 -1.40163 -0.59674 -0.64122 -1.40163 0.493324 -0.53498 -0.95639
19-01-07 1.012762 0.761064 1.591545 1.012762 0.751775 0.277209 0.662062
To be continued
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Continued
event_date (-5,5) (-3,3) (-1,1) (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,5)
02-02-07 1.259024 0.696355 1.238824 1.259024 1.059001 0.369839 0.519512
12-12-07 -0.94365 -0.0911 0.50908 -0.94365 -3.90616 -3.49354 -2.68856
06-03-08 0.57547 0.328507 3.100463 0.57547 4.895368 0.081398 0.572455
28-08-08 -1.96115 -1.1204 -1.19284 -1.96115 -0.88891 -1.38123 -2.29713
17-09-08 0.676022 0.292174 0.463748 0.676022 0.250463 0.620713 0.827828
13-10-08 -0.25696 -0.35965 -0.3247 -0.25696 -1.09235 0.016469 0.483902
06-05-09 -1.46675 -0.72379 -0.58936 -1.46675 -0.1154 0.800601 -0.32363
10-11-09 -0.79847 -0.5838 -1.66995 -0.79847 -2.73084 -0.53199 -0.61808
23-11-09 -0.56462 -0.01887 0.390647 -0.56462 1.099606 1.060185 0.247769
04-12-09 0.907812 1.949039 1.326279 0.907812 1.64925 1.324221 0.716335
06-04-10 1.202025 0.984563 0.537782 1.202025 -1.19368 -1.24044 -1.33001
20-04-10 -0.87062 -1.47962 -0.5667 -0.87062 -2.88899 -2.05985 -1.30929
03-05-10 -0.70333 -0.93982 -0.83456 -0.70333 0.385179 0.168131 -0.49874
26-07-10 -0.88058 -1.35355 -0.64649 -0.88058 -1.95996 -1.18401 -0.76764
10-09-10 -0.87107 -0.7941 -0.86201 -0.87107 0.399047 0.785239 0.249219
29-04-11 -1.67285 -2.8428 -5.03072 -1.67285 -4.20406 -5.48358 -1.50075
01-07-11 1.465334 -0.19635 -3.35168 1.465334 -2.4918 -0.00945 0.989997
05-07-11 -0.31 -0.60373 -0.59839 -0.31 -0.67016 -0.56257 -1.19636
12-08-11 1.35406 0.673429 0.052446 1.35406 -1.87042 0.27392 0.567435
08-11-11 -0.71737 0.13044 -0.87553 -0.71737 -0.47417 -1.08455 -1.21035
22-12-11 0.459827 0.525325 0.409986 0.459827 -0.2188 -0.31509 -0.33315
28-02-08 -0.24884 -0.20018 -0.51429 -0.24884 -3.04891 -0.52827 -0.91958
*significant at 5% level
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Appendices B:
Significance Tests withWhite- Corrected Standard Errors in Different Intervals
1. Significance Test for (-5, 5) Across All Events
2. Significance Test for (-3, 3) Across All Events
3. Significance Test for (-1,1) Across All Events
4. Significance Test for (0,1) Across All Events
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5. Significance Test for (0, 2) Across All Events
6. Significance Test for (0, 3) Across All Events
7. Significance Test for (0, 5) Across All Events
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